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Orphan Embryos
Rev. John R. Connery, S.J.

Father Connery, a faithful contributor to Linacre Quarter ! and a
member of its editorial advisory board, received the Gera . Kelly
Award at the National Federation of Catholic Physicians' Guila annual
meeting in Philadelphia in October, 1984. The award is p . sen ted
periodically to an outstanding theologian.

expression of the love of the parents for each other. Love of the child
is included in the love of the parents for each other. To the extent
th_at the child becomes the product of a scientific procedure, the bond
With conjugal love and intimacy is lost.
But is it not possible for two married people to love a child who is
, _not bonded to them by reason of its origin in an act of conjugal love?
This certainly can and does. happen. We know that parents can and
often do adopt a child who is not their own_in any sense and become
loving parents, able and willing to care for that child. Indeed, we have
•. Christian obligation to love all human beings. This obligation obVIously does not approach the degree of commitment parents must
make to children . But people who may initially have been strangers
often end up making a total commitment to each other in marriage.
So a love commitment to another human being does not necessarily
depend on a prior bond resulting from conjugal intimacy. Would not
th~ same kind of a commitment to a child be possible, especially for a
child who is at least genetically their own?

The recent news report from Australia about the pligh t 0 1 frozen
human embryos virtually orphaned by the death of thei r known
(mother) parent raises several moral questions. One quest10 n has
already surfaced about the morality of freezing human e mbryos.
Others are being raised about the rights of frozen embryos. l: is nat·
ural that such questions should arise, and they call for respo nsP, but it
is critical that the more basic questions be raised as well. We shall try to
give somewhat brief responses to these queries.
The most basic question concerns the morality of the who le proce·
dure of in vitro fertilization, and other forms of artificial reproduc·
tion. The Church, for serious reasons, is opposed to the substitution of
technology for the conjugal act in human procreation. The op position
is obviously not to technology as such; it arises only when th e Church
judges that technology violates the plan of God's creation. The under·
lying reason she opposes this use of technology is that it separates human
procreation from the expression of conjugal or marital love in sexual
intimacy and makes it a laboratory process. It is precisely this love
relationship that makes human procreation different from an imal pro·
creation or reproduction .
Someone might ask why the Church considers this relatio nship so
critical. The basic reason is that; for human beings, procreation of
itself is not enough. Human offspring need the continued care of adult
humans to develop and grow as human beings. Without it, human
development is i.rppossible . To provide for this, God has designed the
human procreative act in such a way that the child is the product of a
loving act of the parents. There is consequently a bond between the
parent and the child which springs from the fact that the child is the

There are certain differences here to which attention should be
called. First, in adoption and other relations initiated with other
~uman beings, a certain selection is possible. In peer relations also one
• free in regard to the degree of commitment he or she wishes to
lbake. There is not the same selection or freedom in dealing with
offspring. The relationship is set from the beginning, and ordinarily
one cannot put a limit to it. Even if the child is handicapped, parents
Ire not free to reject it. So the kind of bonding that comes from the
!'lationship of procreation to the love of the spouses is extremely
llnportant. It is quite true that some people adopt handicapped children, and some marry handicapped partners, but it is a matter of free
eboice, and only a limited number would make such a choice. So the
lack of freedom in the parent-child commitment makes a difference.
The bonding is basic .
In artificial reproduction, there is even a more important difference .
.The child, at least to some extent, is the product of a laboratory
PfOcedure. Since the child belongs genetically to the married couple, it
lrould seem clear that ·they are still responsible for him/ her. On the
~her hand, since the scientific intervention carries with it significant
lllvolvement by third parties (without this intervention there would be
llo child), it would be easier for the parents to evade responsibility for
; child who turned out to be handicapped, or otherwise undesirable.
echnological intervention of this kind would easily introduce an
element of ambiguity in regard to responsibility which would be detrilllental to the welfare and security of the child .
. This problem would be present even in artificial reproduction withIt marriage, that is, an instance where the germ cells came from a
~ied couple. In fact, it was already present in artificial insemination, and this was what Pius XII was talking about back in 1948 when
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he condemned artificial reproduction. But in the minds and a n d ons
of those promoting technological reproduction , these proced1 s are
only the first steps in this direction . Ultimately, the goal is t o ~ arate
procreation totally , not only from conjugal intimacy but al;. from
any dependence on the mother. In other words, the goal is t o 1 1duce
the child outside the human body. And if the goals of eugeni, >ngin·
eering are added, the ultimate aim is to produce the best ·netic
combinations possible. This would complete the separation of J· )crea·
tion from marriage itself. Procreation would be almost totally scien·
tific procedure, dependent on humans only for the germ cell ohem·
selves. Eventually , not only procreation but even the educatim .)f the
child would be transferred from the home to the scientific lab< .1tory.
The bond between procreation and marriage would be to t <• ,y dis·
rupted .
Can One Draw Line?
Some might ask why it is not possible to qraw the line at -n vitro
fertilization within marriage in the sense described above. Th ' scien·
tific intervention here is minimal and it is of great benefit t o ·ouples
who cannot have children themselves. The question is : C m one
reasonably draw t he line at this point? If one allows this kind of
intervention, it is difficult to see how he or she can refuse further
interventions. The reason would be the same or just as impelling: a
couple cannot have children otherwise, or they run the risk o1 having
defective children . If the desire for a child would justify the initial
separation, it would seem to justify further separation. The next step
would undoubtedly be to provide 'for a couple, one of whom was
sterile. This might still be presented as "within marriage " in a broad
sense of the term, that is, in the sense that the petitioners are husband
and wife. And it may appear acceptable on this score. It is easy to
perceive moral differences when one is judging extremes. But when
one is inching along, the discernment becomes much more subtle and
deception is easier. Those who find the initial separation of procrea·
tion from conjugal intimacy acceptable are open to this kind of decep·
tion. Perception of the truth may come too late.
But even if one were to insist that in vitro fertilization, is justifiable,
at least in certain cases (e .g., within marriage, especially wher-e the
semen was obtained from conjugal intimacy) the technique in ques·
tion in the Australian case would .still be objectionable. It would be
objectionable, first of all, because it involved a third party , a donor,
and therefore a basic separation of procreation from m arriage. It
would also be objectionable for a second reason; the inten tion of
bringing human embryos into being solely for " backup " purposes.
This mind-set vitiates the whole procedure.
This latter issue was highlighted in the Australian case by the death
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of the known parent (mother) of the embryos. But it did not originate
with this death. Even if the mother had lived and a successful second
or third implantation was achieved, the procedure would still be
morally problematic . It was vitiated right from the beginning by the
fact that the additional embryos were, by explicit intention, " backup"
embryos. In other words, they would be used only if the first implant·
ation failed . If it was successft1l, they would be disposed of, or become
the victims of "benign" neglect.
What this really means is that the survivai of these embryos was
deliberately made contingent on the failure of the first implantation .
The embryos were deliberately brought into being with the inte ntion
of disposing of them if the first implantation succeed ed. There is no
way in which this can be justified. Conceivably the technicians
involved might have intended to use them in a subsequent pregnancy
(if the first implantation was successful) , but there is little reason to
believe that they entertained this possibility seriously . In other words
these embryos were allowed only a conditioned right to life.
The moral problem related to " backup" embryos could be solved
simply by implanting all the fertilized ova initially, but this carries
With it the risk of multiple pregnancies . Multiple pregnancies do not in
themselves constitute a moral problem, but they may not be desirable.
Even this procedure, however, fails to resolve the initial moral issue
raised by reducing procreation to a technological procedure.
Morality Question Raised
The question about the morality of freezing embryos must also be
laised. In fact , I am not sure that a categorical response can be given
to this question. Ultimately, it depends on whether such a procedure
Would be for the good of the embryo. I do not think one can rule out
the possibility that some day it might be . But at prese n t, those
involved in the Australian case themselves seem to have some· doubt
that the embryos can survive defrosting. I' L' seems clear that, at the
titne it was done, the whole process of freezing embryos was (and
Probably still is) in the experimental stages. The morality of t he procedure consequently has to be judged according to the principles laid
down for experimenting with human beings . I do not know enough
about the procedure t o judge whether these principles were followed ,
but I must confess to serious doubts about this . I say this because there
can be no justification for subjecting human embryos t o strict experi· ·
mentation (not for t he benefit of the embryo , but for the . benefit of
leientific progress) , especially where danger to the embryo is involved .
The physicians current ly involved in t he Australian case openly admit
the danger to survival of attempting to defrost the embryos.
In an emergency situation where hypothermy , even at t he experi·
lllental stage, would offer the only hope, even if minimal , of pre·
, 1984
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serving an already existing embryo long enough to implant it, it W l uld
be permissible, but one could never justify causing such an emerg( 1cy
by deliberately bringing a human embryo into the world for del< ed
implantation. So I do not see how even therapeutic experimenta ion
(for the benefit of the embryo) could be justified in the present ontext.
The question about the right of frozen embryos to implanta on,
that is, to survival, is an important one, but the fact that this righ has
already been compromised should not be forgotten. Even if a :ost
mother can be found, the initial procedure must still be condem ted.
Those responsible for the predicament of the embryos (husband, . ·ife,
physicians, etc.), have an obligation to do what they can to save t! em,
and hence to find a host mother, if this is feasible . In no way can hey
simply dispose of the embryos as long as there is reason to be.ieve
they are still alive.
But I do not think one could impose an obligation on any01 .e to
host such a child. If some married couple wanted a child, hostir,g an
orphaned embryo might be an admirable way of fulfilling their w ishes. '
It might also be a great act of charity to host such an embryo. Bm one
can hardly speak in terms of any obligation to do so. The "right,;" or
justice approach is indeed a valid one, but it is also very difficult to
apply in situations like the present one. It may be easy enough to
argue from the rights of one individual to what others in justice o ught
not to do. But one must be very careful about what inferences are
drawn from the existence of rights as to what others ought to rio in
justice. This kind of act, relieving a person in need, is prompted by
Christian charity rather than justice. But, as already mentio ned, it
would be a matter of generosity rather than of obligation .

Are You Moving?
If the next issue of this journal should be delivered to a different address, please advise AT ONCE. The return postage
and cost of remailing this publication is becoming more and
more costly. Your cooperation in ~eeping us up-to-date with
your address will be most helpful.
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Testimony for the Subcommittee
on Investigations and Oversights
August 9, 1984
Rev. Donald McCarthy, Ph.D.

Rev. Donald G. McCarthy is a priest of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Cincinnati. He holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of
Louvain, Belgium, and in 1972-73 he did a residency in theology and
medical ethics at the Institute of Religion in the Texas Medical Center
in Houston .
Since 1973 he has served as a resource person and lecturer for
conferences in' the field of medical ethics. He was elected to the boa~d
of the Pope John Medical-Moral Research and Education Center zn
December, 1977. He moved to St. Louis in August, 1979 to accept the
position of director of education at the Pope John Center. In Aug_ust,
1984 he returned to Cincinnati to become pastor of St. Antonmus
Pari~h, but he continues to serve the Pope John Center as senior
educational consultant.
He is a member of the American Society of Christian Ethics, the
Catholic Theological Society o{America, and the Institute for Theological Encounter with Science and Technology . He was a professor at
Mount St. Mary Seminary in Cincinnati from 1960-79 and director of
. the Newman Center at the University of Cincinnati from 1960-69.

My name is Donald McCarthy and I am a Catholic priest of the
Archdiocese of Cincinnati. For the past five years, I have served as
director of education of the Pope John XXIII Medical-Moral Resear~h
Bnd. Education Center in St. Louis, Missouri. Our Center stud1es
elllerging medical-moral issues from the perspective_ of the JudeaChristian tradition and Catholic teaching. Because I d1d my doctorate
in philosphy with a doctoral thesis on the philosophical eth~cs of
Bertrand Russell, one of this century's greatest secular humanists, I
have some understarlding also of medical ethics from a secular humanist perspective.
November, 1984
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